Honesty Without Truth: Lies, Accuracy, and the Criminal Justice Process by Griffin, Lisa Kern
 HONESTY WITHOUT TRUTH: LIES, 
ACCURACY, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCESS 
Lisa Kern Griffin† 
Focusing on “lying” is a natural response to uncertainty 
but too narrow of a concern.  Honesty and truth are not the 
same thing and conflating them can actually inhibit accuracy. 
In several settings across investigations and trials, the 
criminal justice system elevates compliant statements, 
misguided beliefs, and confident opinions while excluding 
more complex evidence.  Error often results.  Some 
interrogation techniques, for example, privilege cooperation 
over information.  Those interactions can yield incomplete or 
false statements, confessions, and even guilty pleas. 
Because of the impeachment rules that purportedly prevent 
perjury, the most knowledgeable witnesses may be 
precluded from taking the stand.  The current construction of 
the Confrontation Clause right also excludes some reliable 
evidence—especially from victim witnesses—because it 
favors face-to-face conflict even though overrated demeanor 
cues can mislead.  And courts permit testimony from forensic 
experts about pattern matches, such as bite-marks and 
ballistics, if those witnesses find their own methodologies 
persuasive despite recent studies discrediting their 
techniques.  Exploring the points of disconnect between 
honesty and truth exposes some flaws in the criminal justice 
process and some opportunities to advance fact-finding, 
truth-seeking, and accuracy instead. At a time when 
“post-truth” challenges to shared baselines beyond the 
courtroom grow more pressing, scaffolding legal institutions, 
so they can provide needed structure and helpful models, 
seems particularly important.  Assessing the legitimacy of 
legal outcomes and fostering the engagement necessary to 
reach just conclusions despite adversarial positions could 
also have an impact on declining facts and decaying trust in 
broader public life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Identifying and coping with lying has become a central 
focus of public discourse.  And the institutions of criminal 
justice provide a natural setting in which to evaluate the effects 
of that priority.  In a setting where advocates dispute issues 
within a formal set of rules and resolving epistemic uncertainty 
is the stated goal, we can look closely at the role of “honesty” 
in discovering “truth.”  And it turns out that acquiescence to 
law enforcement, honest mistakes, and sincere but misguided 
beliefs can all generate enduring errors.  A binary approach to 
the value of evidence also tends to exclude the more nuanced 
and challenging testimony that might offer a more complete 
picture of events. 
Critically evaluating the systematic premium on “not lying” 
helps explain why errors persist.  Even when an eyewitness 
identification is manipulated, a jailhouse snitch’s testimony 
induced, or a suspect’s confession coerced, police and 
prosecutors uncritically accept the evidence as accurate 
because they view it as usefully candid.  And, after a 
conviction, it is virtually impossible to clarify a statement, to 
recant successfully, or to overcome faulty forensic evidence. 
Moreover, during trials, the arcane rules surrounding 
credibility determinations may silence essential testimony. 
Defendants are often precluded from testifying because they 
can be impeached with any prior convictions in order to alert 
jurors to their potential to commit perjury.  Out-of-court 
statements by unavailable victims are also excluded because 
of a preoccupation with fact-finding as an in-person clash or 
confrontation. 
Some of the ways in which we enforce honesty thus keep 
us from finding the truth.  Bad-faith witnesses may tell 
outright lies, but good-faith witnesses will also make mistakes. 
Being honest—which generally means not intentionally stating 
falsehoods—seems a relatively simple proposition.  There is a 
distinction, however, between “not lying” and “producing 
truth,” and it is one that criminal procedure often overlooks. 
Seeking accurate results through criminal investigation and 
adjudication is not simple at all.  It requires costlier and more 
complex procedures than only identifying lies. 
Of course, “truth” in adjudication refers neither to 
transcendence nor to the verifiable findings of a setting like a 
laboratory.  Truth-seeking in court involves the culling and 
arranging of facts “in such a way as to allow conclusions, 
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decisions, agreements.”1  Though adversaries may speak of 
“truth-telling” by individuals and of “wanting the truth” from 
witnesses on the stand,2 rarely will a single source reveal the 
whole picture.  One cannot see all that occurred before power 
corrupted, an intimate relationship soured, a corporate actor 
took an uncalculated risk, the chaos of a terrible accident 
unfolded, or violence welled up.  The truth of these things is a 
liquid rather than a line.  It cannot be told all at once or traced 
to one data point.  It is not conveyed so much as collected and 
contained.  What emerges from the adjudicative process is thus 
a substitute.  The outcome stands for the truth, much as 
money is accepted as a substitute for value and calendars and 
clocks purport to measure the concept of time.  Juries reach 
verdicts, judges enter convictions, and legal truth results. 
I rely here on the same assumption that the law itself 
makes—that there is such a thing as facts, incomplete and 
imperfect, but also real and important.  The formal result of 
adjudication does not capture the full substantive truth but 
aims for close correspondence.  In the process, factfinders 
should conclude “of what is that it is, and of what is not that 
it is not,” with as much precision as possible.3  To do that, to 
reliably reach a verdict, requires broad engagement with data 
and testimony that increase knowledge.  Regarding the process 
as too binary—too dependent on determining who has lied—
can constrain inputs in a way that diminishes accuracy and 
narrows the aperture on “what happened.” 
Lying and getting things wrong overlap to some extent, but 
their fundamental gear mechanisms are different.  All lies are 
false, but not all falsehoods are lies.  For one thing, some 
parties honestly make completely inaccurate statements. 
More than a quarter of Americans would tell you with great 
conviction that the sun orbits the earth.4  The lying eyes of 
good faith witnesses who identify perpetrators provide another 
example.  One study concluded that fully three quarters of 
 1 STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T, CAN’T,
AND SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 196 (2001). 
2 See, e.g., A FEW GOOD MEN (Castle Rock Entertainment 1992). 
 3 This phrasing references Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth. 
Marian David, The Correspondence Theory of Truth, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2016 ed.), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#Bib 
[https://perma.cc/4MK2-PQMF]. 
4 Eleanor Barkhorn, What Americans Don’t Know About Science, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 15, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/02/what-americans-
dont-know-about-science/283864/ [ https://perma.cc/6PW6-EHX2]. 
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wrongful convictions are connected to mistaken eyewitness 
identifications.5  Though they provide compelling testimony 
declaring that a defendant committed the crime, and believe 
what they say, many eyewitnesses are being honest without 
telling the truth.  Moreover, the FBI analyst who claimed “100 
percent” certainty when erroneously matching Oregon lawyer 
Brandon Mayfield’s fingerprints to a latent print at the site of 
the Madrid terrorist bombing could not have been more sincere 
at the time.6 
Honesty can play a part in the search for legal truth but is 
not sufficient.  And legal truth can capture true propositions 
external to the investigative and adjudicative processes, but it 
never includes the full factual truth of any event.7  This Essay 
considers how the definition, detection, and deterrence of 
dishonesty can occasionally widen the distance between legal 
and factual truth.  Interrogation techniques designed to get 
suspects to talk can yield false and incomplete, albeit 
forthcoming, confessions.  Impeachment rules aimed at 
precluding perjury often mean that the most knowledgeable 
witnesses cannot take the stand.  The current construction of 
the Confrontation Clause right excludes some evidence 
because it privileges face-to-face confrontations even though 
demeanor cues can be profoundly misleading.  And forensic 
experts can introduce subjective conclusions about pattern 
matches when they appear authoritative or find their own 
methodologies compelling.  The sections that follow explore the 
potential for “true lies” and “honest inaccuracies” in each of 
these contexts, as well as the broader implications of 
recognizing a distinction between truth and honesty. 
I 
INTERROGATIONS AND THE FORTHCOMING SUSPECT 
In some instances, interviewing suspects and obtaining 
their cooperation advances truth-seeking, but too often 
interrogations focus exclusively on a suspect’s perceived 
honesty and ignore critical information.  Law enforcement 
 5 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 48 (2011). 
 6 See David Stout, Report Faults F.B.I.’s Fingerprint Scrutiny in Arrest of 
Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/17/politics/report-faults-fbis-fingerprint-
scrutiny-in-arrest-of-lawyer.html [https://perma.cc/7ATD-7H8D]. 
 7 See, e.g., William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 
329, 336-37 (1995) (“As each successive stage of the criminal process is carefully 
considered, there is only slight interest in and consideration of an accused’s 
factual innocence.”). 
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agents want suspects to talk but have a preconceived notion of 
what they will say.  They tend to ask questions only after they 
have concluded that a suspect is guilty.8  In fact, many police 
officers confidently assert that they “do not interrogate 
innocent people.”9  Nor do they test competing hypotheses once 
they have recorded a witness statement consistent with the 
theory of the case or extracted a confession that will ensure an 
efficient clearance rate.10  Overcoming silence and prompting 
speech—sometimes even planting a false script to be 
repeated—takes precedence over actually investigating what 
happened. 
These encounters enforce a version of honesty that really 
consists of compliance and cooperation.  Law enforcement 
agents confuse the thing they are doing—making suspects 
speak—with the thing they really want, which is accurate 
information.  They draw the target around the hit they get and 
assume a confession is reliable in every case because they 
want what they are hearing to be true and stop seeking the 
truth itself.  Common practices that can undercut accuracy 
include guilt-assuming inquiries, prolonged interrogations,11 
proffering false inculpatory evidence,12 tainting interrogations 
with non-public information, and suggesting an exit strategy 
in exchange for a suspect’s willingness to follow the script.13  
Many of these problematic techniques date back to the 1960s 
and the wide adoption of the police manual authored by Inbau 
and Reid.14  The manual advises maintaining cramped and 
isolated interview rooms and applying psychological pressures 
to elicit statements.15  It replaced true custodial violence—the 
physically coercive tactics that were known as the “third 
degree”16—but it substituted new forms of procedural violence. 
 8 See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put 
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 216 (2005) (describing the process 
an officer uses to determine whether a person is a suspect or witness, and thus, 
whether the officer should more thoroughly interrogate that person). 
9 Id. 
10 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel 
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 316. 
11 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Silence, Confessions, and the New Accuracy 
Imperative, 65 DUKE L.J. 697, 699 (2016). 
12 See George C. Thomas III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation, 
39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1293, 1296-1301 (2007). 
13 See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 198 (1991). 
14 FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (5th ed. 
2011). 
15 See id. at 88 (describing how to elicit a “full response” from a suspect). 
16 See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 62–64 
(2008). 
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Although the Supreme Court recognized and critiqued the 
manual’s instructions for soft coercion as long ago as the 1966 
Miranda decision,17 the basic protocols for interacting with 
suspects have changed little over the past fifty years.18 
This remains the case despite a well-documented 
connection between interrogation techniques and wrongful 
convictions.  The West Memphis Three, the Norfolk Four, and 
the Central Park Five, for example,19 are all notorious cases in 
which young, vulnerable, and disadvantaged defendants were 
irreparably damaged by their own false confessions.  Poorly 
educated and mentally unstable defendants are especially 
susceptible to agreeing with law enforcement’s version of 
events in order to end the ordeal of questioning.20  Their plight 
has become more visible as more law enforcement agencies 
record interrogations, and serialized true crime stories also 
make that footage accessible to the public.  In the recent 
documentary series, The Confession Tapes, police induce false 
confessions by commanding that suspects “say it and be done 
with it,” insisting that they “open their minds” and “come 
around,” and suggesting that they just “close their eyes” and 
repeat what police have told them.21  Suspects deny 
responsibility for hours on the recordings but eventually 
succumb to the narratives that law enforcement agents 
advance. 
Some suspects wrongly assume that the adjudicative 
process will later confirm their innocence, but for others, the 
admissions are “coerced-internalized” confessions, and they 
become convinced that they must have committed the crime.22  
One episode of The Confession Tapes shows a defendant, 
confronted with an array of false evidence against him, 
concluding “I guess I might have did it then.”23  The Netflix 
17 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-58 (1966). 
18 See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCESS 121–22, 311 n.11 (2012). 
19 See, e.g., TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE 
CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008). 
20 Saul M. Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in 
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH AND REGULATION 207, 216 (Tom 
Williamson ed., 2006). 
21 The Confession Tapes: The Labor Day Murders (Netflix Sept. 8, 2017). 
22 See, e.g., Kassin, supra note 20, at 207 (discussing the prevalence and 
risks of false confessions in criminal proceedings). 
23 The Confession Tapes: A Public Apology (Netflix Sept. 8, 2017); Andrew 
Knapp, Wesley Myers “Broken” After Admitting for 2nd Time to North Charleston 
Killing He Insisted He Didn’t Commit, POST & COURIER (Oct. 8, 2017), 
https://www.postandcourier.com/news/wesley-myers-broken-after-admitting-
for-nd-time-to-north/article_717aa5c2-a874-11e7-bcce-bf50eea5ada5.html 
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documentary Making a Murderer similarly portrays Brendan 
Dassey—sixteen years old and with an IQ in the 
mid-seventies—accepting his involvement in a murder in slow 
motion after hours of detectives pleading with him, planting 
information, and persuading him that he will not face 
punishment for telling them “what [they] already know.”24 
It was once inconceivable that innocent people would 
confess to crimes.  But now it is undeniable that they do,25 
often because of this single-minded focus on whether suspects 
are forthcoming and apparent indifference to the accuracy of 
what they say.  Reforms, such as non-confrontational 
interviews and prohibitions on police lying, could change that.  
But they seem unlikely until seeking information (truth) 
becomes more important than obtaining a confession 
(perceived honesty).  A first step would be for courts and law 
enforcement to recognize the potential distinction between 
those two things. 
II 
IMPEACHMENT AND THE DEFENDANT WITNESS 
Part of the leverage police and prosecutors use to make 
defendants more forthcoming pretrial comes from the silencing 
effect of impeachment rules at trial.  When suspects become 
trial defendants, they are no longer encouraged to speak.  In 
fact, because of concerns that they will lie, evidentiary rules 
tend to preclude their testimony altogether.  The federal rules 
of evidence have a stated purpose: “ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.”26  To achieve that end, the rules 
tend to favor the admission of evidence and factfinders’ receipt 
of information.  One of the most controversial rules, however, 
has the opposite effect and constrains potential testimony by 
defendants.  All testifying witnesses—including criminal 
defendants—may face questioning about their past felony 
convictions.27  Any crime, the reasoning goes, portends a 
willingness to violate the social contract, and thus a propensity 
[https://perma.cc/4M63-QRLD]. 
 24 Making a Murderer: Indefensible (Netflix Dec. 18, 2015); see Dassey v. 
Dittman, 201 F.Supp.3d 963, 967 (E.D. Wis. 2016), aff’d, 860 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 
2017), vacated, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 25 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions 
in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 901 (2004) (describing challenges to 
the “conventional wisdom that innocent people are never convicted in the 
American criminal justice system”). 
26 FED. R. EVID. 102. 
27 FED. R. EVID. 609. 
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to commit perjury as well.28  About a million criminal 
defendants pass through the criminal justice system every 
year, and all but 25,000 of them say almost nothing to anyone 
in court apart from entering a guilty plea.29  Yet engagement 
with defendants may provide the best opportunity to determine 
what happened in any case. 
Until the late nineteenth century, defendants were not 
examined under oath so as not to force the choice of 
“self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.”30  Jurors, it was 
thought, would never believe an interested party anyway, and 
allowing them to testify only endangered the important 
“presumption that all sworn evidence is truthful.”31  This 
limitation has been lifted, along with the common-law 
prohibition against felons offering testimony.32  But the 
prospect of impeachment has virtually the same effect. 
Journalists have a norm—or at least they used to—against 
labeling individuals liars across contexts.33  There is no such 
norm in court.  Witnesses get called liars all the time. 
According to the logic of the impeachment rules, there is such 
a thing as just “being a liar,” and jurors ought to know when 
any “liar” is testifying.  Of course, the reasoning fails at several 
points.  Because of the breadth of the criminal code and the 
prevalence of plea bargaining resolutions, past felony 
convictions do not necessarily signal knowing violations of 
legal norms.34  And even past crimes involving clear intent and 
express acts of dishonesty will not necessarily predict lying 
under oath.  Social psychology long ago moved beyond the trait 
theory on which the rule’s rationale depends and recognized 
28 See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts 
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 301 (2008).
29 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1458 (2005). 
30 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
31 George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 625 
(1997). 
32 See id. at 656–58. 
33 See, e.g., Reed Richardson, Mainstream Media Still Won’t Tell the Truth 
About Trump’s Lies, SALON (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.salon.com/2017/11/30/mainstream-media-still-wont-tell-the-
truth-about-trumps-lies/ [https://perma.cc/BH6Z-S9QV] (“Within the stilted 
framework of mainstream news ‘objectivity,’ the simple act of calling out ‘lies’ or 
‘lying’ by a politician—especially a president—is now taboo. . . .  [T]he use of these 
words to identify a documented falsehood is now considered controversial, 
partisan, inflammatory, unfair.”). 
 34 See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 
1995 (2016). 
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the influence of situational pressures.35  Moral conduct in one 
particular scenario does not portend an identical response in 
a different one.  The rules of evidence largely preclude 
prosecutors from drawing an inference from character to 
conduct.36  Yet pointing to a witness’s general lack of integrity 
remains a permissible way to discredit testimony. 
The practice purports to equip jurors with a tool to discern 
dishonesty.  It is a blunt instrument, however, and one they do 
not particularly need.  Of course, guilty defendants will “choose 
to testify about anything that might improve their chances and 
about which they might imagine they can be persuasive,” and 
for all of them “acquittal is the overriding, intensely desired, 
goal.”37  Frankly, jurors know that, and in some jurisdictions, 
they also get an instruction urging special caution with a 
defendant’s testimony.38  As one might anticipate, jurors rarely 
rely on convictions as evidence of credibility.  The experimental 
work on Federal Rule of Evidence 609 suggests instead that 
prior convictions impact perceived likelihood that the 
defendant committed the charged offense.39  Empirical data on 
testifying defendants also reveals that past crimes like perjury 
are not the most damaging to their chances of acquittal. 
Rather, the more similar a prior crime is to the crime charged, 
the more perilous it is to testify.40 
Of course, many defendants are best advised to stay silent 
throughout trial, but some need and want to participate.  A 
defendant witness “vindicate[s] her view of justice as against 
the views of others.”41  Even if the testimony involves some 
dissembling, that introduces a “culturally productive” 
contradiction42 when the jury then weighs it against other 
evidence and determines whether the witness’s memory, 
judgment, and descriptive powers are fallible and whether the 
35 See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: 
Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 964 (2006). 
36 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
37 H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 813 (1993). 
38 See Sixth Cir. Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions § 7.02B (updated as of Dec. 
20, 2017); Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions of the Seventh Cir. § 3.01 (2012 ed.). 
39 See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior 
Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 
486, 490 (2008). 
40 See Ric Simmons, An Empirical Study of Rule 609 and Suggestions for 
Practical Reform, 59 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1013 (2018). 
41 Norman W. Spaulding, The Artifice of Advocacy: Perjury and Participation 
in the American Adversary System, in LAW AND LIES: DECEPTION AND TRUTH-TELLING 
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 81, 139 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015). 
42 See id. at 138. 
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story has credibility.  Moreover, lying that does occur will often 
follow truthful revelations.43  Defendant testimony may be 
imperfect, but it is also available, efficient, and a unique source 
of information.  And sorting through any omissions, 
exaggerations, or shadings implicates exactly the set of skills 
jurors supposedly bring to the courtroom.  Yet concern with a 
defendant’s complete honesty often precludes any testimony at 
all.  The rule thus privileges lie prevention over a truth-seeking 
opportunity. 
Nor is accuracy the only thing at stake—fairness to the 
defendant also suggests the need for some space within which 
to construct a counter-narrative.  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, the defendant “above all others may be in a 
position to meet the prosecution’s case.”44  A defendant bearing 
witness has more impact than the testimony of “the police, of 
informants, of co-defendants, and of expert witnesses.”45  
Without testifying, defendants stand little chance of 
persuading a jury.46  Because alerting jurors to prior criminal 
conduct increases the chances of a guilty verdict, a defendant 
with criminal history effectively cannot testify. 
The rule not only codifies a stereotype about felons but 
also imposes further collateral consequences of past 
convictions.  Defendants are more likely to bargain away their 
trial rights and plead guilty if a criminal record will keep them 
off the stand.  Testifying also impacts a defendant’s 
subsequent reintegration,47 and the chance to hear from a 
defendant can enable understanding and recovery for victims 
as well.  Letting people tell their stories, even horrible ones, 
can fuel reconciliation.  Penalizing defendants so that they will 
never do so represents a poorly-reasoned decision.  It reveals 
all the criminal conduct in a defendant’s past that may or may 
not suggest a tendency to lie rather than encourage testimony 
that can offer the most complete, and ultimately the most 
truthful picture of the events surrounding the crime charged.48 
43 See Evelyne Debey, Jan De Houwer & Bruno Verschuere, Lying Relies on 
the Truth, 132 COGNITION 324, 331 (2014). 
44 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961). 
45 Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: 
The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial 
Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1370 (2009). 
46 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1, 12 (1993).
47 See Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: 
Prior Conviction Impeachment and the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 835, 873 (2016). 
48 See Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads: Turn to Accuracy, 87 S. 
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III 
CONFRONTATION AND THE SUBSTANCE OF STATEMENTS 
A different form of credibility concern—one grounded in 
the constitutional right to “confront” the evidence against 
you—has sometimes silenced victim witnesses too. 
Cross-examination has taken on new significance in 
contemporary trials, as the salience of the oath requirement 
has declined.  When it was widely believed that lying under 
oath meant eternal damnation, there was no real need for 
veracity cues or tests.49  But courts now seek to both inform 
and equip jurors to identify “liars” while observing their 
testimony, and that includes the complaining witnesses for the 
prosecution. 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”50  Evidentiary rules already exclude many statements 
made by out-of-court speakers, but there are exceptions based 
on the necessity or reliability of particular hearsay evidence. 
The Supreme Court formerly interpreted the Confrontation 
Clause to allow the use of evidence that fell within 
well-established exceptions to the hearsay ban or otherwise 
possessed “indicia of reliability.”51  In a series of cases 
beginning in 2004, the Court expanded the constitutional 
requirement and declared that all witnesses must be available 
for cross-examination if their out-of-court statements 
constitute “testimonial” ones offered against a defendant.52  
Accounts by victims that would otherwise fit within hearsay 
exceptions fall into that category, including statements under 
oath in formal settings like the grand jury. 
Among the hundreds of defendants exonerated by DNA 
evidence in recent decades, there is not one whose wrongful 
conviction rested on “unconfronted hearsay,” which is 
regularly excluded by the current construction of the rule 
announced in Crawford.  Meanwhile, flawed eyewitness 
testimony, false confessions, and faulty forensics are rarely 
screened out because they contain perceived indicators of 
honesty.  In other words, we are preferring evidence that 
CAL. L. REV. 421, 438 (2014). 
49 See Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence?  Neuroscience, 
Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV 1191, 1194 (2010). 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
51 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980). 
52 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
33 CORNELL LAW REVIEW ONLINE   [Vol.104:22 
clearly causes wrongful convictions and excluding statements 
jurors have shown themselves well equipped to evaluate. 
To find out what happened, the best source will often be a 
direct witness, testifying live, under oath, and subject to 
cross-examination.  In fact, that is all the more reason to have 
rules that allow criminal defendants to testify.  But what about 
when a witness has died, or disappeared, or now refuses to 
talk?  When the firsthand account is not available, sometimes 
the earlier statement constitutes the only source of 
information, and sometimes it has been tested in ways that 
reinforce its accuracy.  Yet the definition the Court now uses 
to determine which statements fall into the testimonial 
category sets aside reliability and focuses exclusively on the 
significance of a performative opportunity to confront 
witnesses in person. 
The requirement that defendants “look an accuser in the 
eye” precludes admission of hearsay assertions if they tend to 
accuse or have the capacity to condemn.  If a victim’s 
statement is testimonial—even when it is made to a first 
responder, medical professional, social worker, counselor, 
friend, or family member—then it may be inadmissible.  That 
can lead to silencing victims when their only available 
statements come after the most fearful encounters, including 
in domestic violence scenarios.  When a witness is available, 
in-court testimony ought to be required.  But what about when 
it is not possible?  In that case, the preference for confrontation 
in the form of a verbal duel or ritual staring contest does 
silence victims. 
One example comes from a 2008 Wisconsin case in which 
Mark Jensen was convicted of murdering his wife Julie by 
poisoning her with antifreeze.53  He claimed she committed 
suicide, but the strongest evidence against him was a letter she 
gave to a neighbor before her death describing her terror and 
her certainty that Mark was intent on killing her.  “I am 
suspicious of Mark’s behaviors,” she wrote, “[and] fear for my 
early demise.”  The letter also disclaimed any intention to 
commit suicide because of her love for her children.  The jurors 
who convicted Mark in his first trial saw the letter and 
commented later that it was a “clear road map” to his 
conviction.54  The letter’s admission, however, was a 
Confrontation Clause violation that later jeopardized the 
53 See State v. Jensen, 794 N.W.2d 482, 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). 
 54 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 284
(2013). 
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verdict.  To be sure, any such document has some 
self-impeaching qualities, and the jury might have seen it as 
consistent with Mark’s claim that Julie was despondent about 
an affair and plotted to kill herself and frame him as revenge. 
Factfinders, however, could readily observe the letter’s defects 
even without Julie on the witness stand.  Its exclusion 
illustrates misplaced confidence in confrontation itself as a test 
of deception. 
What the Court has called the “irreducible literal 
meaning”55 of confrontation—which is to stare a witness 
down—actually serves only a limited purpose.  Justice Scalia 
regarded his opinions on the Confrontation Clause as his most 
significant legacy.56  In them, he repeatedly referenced 
“something deep in human nature” that requires the 
“essential” physical presence of an accusing witness.57  While 
the fairness dimensions of confrontation hold up to scrutiny, 
its role in assuring reliability does not.  Looking at someone 
does not help to detect deception and might even hinder it.  As 
the experimental evidence indicates, “ordinary observers do 
not benefit from the opportunity to observe nonverbal behavior 
in judging whether someone is lying.”58  Moreover, “there is 
little correlation between people’s confidence in their ability to 
detect deception and their accuracy.”59 
In fact, almost every non-verbal cue of dishonesty is 
subject to conflicting interpretations.60  Both blinking too 
much and not blinking supposedly indicate lying.  The same 
goes for staring and avoiding eye contact, talking too fast and 
choosing words too deliberately, having inconsistencies in a 
narrative and keeping the story straight, smiling and frowning, 
and fidgeting and sitting rigidly still.  Showing obvious nerves, 
sweating, slumping, and eye-darting—clinical studies 
suggest—are as likely to be the result of the stress of the 
courtroom situation as of effortful lying.61  Accordingly, 
55 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-19 (1988). 
 56 See Marcia Coyle, Antonin Scalia’s “Profound” Influence on the Supreme 
Court, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 14, 2016), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202749718827/?slreturn=2
0180119171453 [https://perma.cc/67XE-SG5U]. 
57 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017. 
58 Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088 (1991). 
59 Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Evolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807, 837 
(2014). 
60 See, e.g., Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. 
L. REV. 143, 176-77 (2011).
61 See Margaret Talbot, Duped, NEW YORKER (July 2, 2007), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/07/02/duped 
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cross-examination has the potential to mask truth, as well as 
reveal it.  Occasionally, it will highlight unmistakable signs of 
falsehood, but it can also make honest witnesses appear 
hesitant, confused, or defiant, and thereby mislead the 
factfinder to reject truthful evidence. 
Popular culture perpetuates the myth that confrontation 
will yield a smoking gun or telltale sign.  Countless magazine 
articles list techniques for identifying the liars in your social 
and professional circles with behavioral cues.  The television 
series Lie to Me popularized the theory of detecting deception 
through observing micro-expressions.  Recent books, like 
Liespotting, promise to reveal the “single most dangerous 
expression to watch out for in business and personal 
relationships.”62  And, in Spy the Lie, “former CIA officers teach 
you how to detect deception” by observing behavior.63  This 
concept surfaces as well in just about every police manual. 
Seventy-eight percent of police officers report that they make 
veracity judgments based on nonverbal cues like “gaze 
aversion.”64  Nonverbal cues work in some contexts—detecting 
social status, appraising sexual desire, recognizing personality 
traits—but they do not reliably signal deception. 
The most useful confrontation in terms of arriving at the 
larger truth in a case has more to do with getting answers than 
just asking questions.  Some out-of-court statements excluded 
by the Confrontation Clause—especially written ones or 
recorded testimony—provide a much richer opportunity to test 
the substance of proffered facts for inconsistencies and 
contradictions.  It takes more effort to evaluate substance than 
to observe behavior, but it yields more information.65  And that 
opportunity is what the Confrontation Clause broadly 
guarantees: a criminal defendant’s right “to know, to examine, 
[https://perma.cc/3N27-AVCR] (“People who are afraid of being disbelieved, even 
when they are telling the truth, may well look more nervous than people who are 
lying.”). 
 62 The author concludes that the danger signal emerges from any expression 
of “contempt,” which could appear in a “wrinkle in the nose, eye rolling, or a 
raised nostril combined with a curled upper lip.”  PAMELA MEYER, LIESPOTTING: 
PROVEN TECHNIQUES TO DETECT DECEPTION 68 (2010).  These expressions—like, 
apparently, any other asymmetrical gesture—are described by Meyer as masks 
because “[n]atural truthful gestures typically occur evenly on both sides.”  Id. at 
60. 
63 PHILIP HOUSTON, MICHAEL FLOYD & SUSAN CARNICERO, SPY THE LIE (2013). 
 64 Aldert Vrij, Nonverbal Detection of Deception, in FINDING THE TRUTH IN THE
COURTROOM: DEALING WITH DECEPTION, LIES, AND MEMORIES 163, 165 (Henry 
Otgaar & Mark L. Howe eds., 2018). 
65 See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of 
Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 335 (2004). 
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to explain[,] and to rebut” the evidence against her.66  
Well-documented statements can be verified given other 
evidence and context.  Several experiments have demonstrated 
that transcripts are superior to live testimony when it comes 
to making credibility judgments.67  Recorded statements 
actually eliminate the distracting and distorting nonverbal 
data and underscore verbal content.  Moreover, out-of-court 
statements are more likely to be unprepared and unrehearsed. 
Of course, firsthand witnesses are better than secondhand 
ones, when they are available.  And, of course, some unique 
secondhand testimony presents real dangers of unfairness or 
inaccuracy.  But a secondhand account that supplements 
other evidence may be preferable to denying the factfinder 
information altogether, and in too many cases, the idea that all 
statements must be tested by adversarial combat excludes 
them. 
The prohibition persists because confrontation, as Justice 
Scalia redefined it, is a formal rather than a functional 
process.68  To be faced down and to appear forthcoming 
satisfies the standard, while the quality of the information 
obtained and its relationship to accuracy is irrelevant.69  
Accordingly, a witness on the stand and in the chair, even with 
no memory of the relevant events, meets the constitutional 
requirement.70 
Although the Confrontation Clause plays an important role 
in excluding statements that may have been influenced by 
government actors, it does not make trials more accurate—or 
ultimately more truthful exercises—to silence victim witnesses 
whose statements contain essential information and whose 
motivations can be assessed from the record.71  Mistakenly 
 66 Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 
8 J. PUB. L. 381, 402 (1959). 
 67 See, e.g., Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Individual Differences 
in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477, 483 (2007). 
 68 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that the Confrontation 
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed 
in a particular manner”). 
 69 See Joyce Plotnikoff & Richard Woolfson, “Kicking and Screaming”: The 
Slow Road to Best Evidence, in CHILDREN AND CROSS-EXAMINATION: TIME TO 
CHANGE THE RULES? 21, 22 (John R. Spencer & Michael E. Lamb eds., 2012) 
(“[C]ross-examination aims not at accuracy or best evidence but at persuading 
witnesses to adopt an alternative version of events or discrediting their 
evidence.”). 
70 United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988). 
 71 See David Alan Sklansky, Confrontation and Fairness, 45 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 103, 108 (2012). 
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regarding cross-examination as an assurance of honesty has 
resulted in some poor sorting of testimony.  The durable myth 
of demeanor as a lie detection tool persists, despite its potential 
to distort, and that myth can also impede truth-seeking by 
supporting the exclusion of some necessary and reliable 
witness statements. 
IV 
FORENSIC FACTS AND FALSE PRECISION 
A related truth-seeking issue has arisen with regard to 
forensic testimony, which at first seems like the one form of 
evidence from which we might expect empirical clarity.  With 
evidence that is supposedly scientific, we might worry less 
about accuracy, but recent developments suggest that we 
should actually worry more.  A frequently quoted line 
attributed to Mark Twain reminds us that “it isn’t what you 
don’t know that gets you into trouble but what you know for 
sure that just ain’t so.”  A version of that quotation served as 
the on-screen epigraph to two recent films: The Big Short,72 
which exposes the economic fallacies that drove the recent 
financial crisis, and An Inconvenient Truth,73 which documents 
the effort to raise awareness of scientific facts about climate 
change.  It was sourced to Mark Twain in both places, but 
Twain did not say it.74  The instability of both content and 
context calls to mind one of the most powerful “broken system” 
stories about criminal justice in recent years: the discovery 
that while many methods have been presented as scientifically 
certain, they just were not so. 
For decades, and with respect to some techniques for 
almost a century, courts have allowed expert testimony about 
superficial pattern matches that link known samples to data 
collected in criminal investigations.  The standard by which the 
courts measure the reliability of this expertise—codified in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and known as the Daubert 
standard—continues to place particular weight on whether 
other experts in the field rely on similar methodologies.  That 
is, whether it is “generally accepted”75 and “peer reviewed.”76  
72 THE BIG SHORT (Paramount Pictures 2015). 
73 AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Classics 2006). 
74 Nineteenth century humorist Josh Billings seems to have originated the 
saying.  JOSH BILLINGS, EVERYBODY’S FRIEND, OR JOSH BILLING’S ENCYCLOPEDIA AND 
PROVERBIAL PHILOSOPHY OF WIT AND HUMOR 286 (1874) (“I honestly beleave it iz 
better tew know nothing than two know what ain’t so.”). 
75 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584 (1993). 
76 Id. at 594; see also FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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Within professional communities of interest, however, an 
honest commitment to the validity of expert analysis turns out 
to have little to do with its truth or reliability.  Experts who 
make their livings or their reputations with the same 
technique—members of the Association of Firemark and 
Toolmark Examiners, for example—may share a sincere belief 
that a method works, but they are often mistaken.  Moreover, 
they may profit handsomely from purveying the expertise even 
when they have doubts about its utility.  These Associations 
have internal publications as well, and ones that are often cited 
to support the peer-review factor.  But publishing there 
amounts to “talk within congregations of true believers” and 
does not allow the critical review and disinterested assessment 
that the Daubert Court envisioned.77 
Although firearm and toolmark analysts have long stated 
that their discipline has “near-perfect” accuracy, the most 
recent studies indicate a high false-positive rate.  Missing 
context for forensic testimony also matters.  Experts can testify 
honestly that a certain gun could have fired a bullet or that a 
particular screwdriver could have made the pry marks on a 
door.  But they cannot make that assertion to the exclusion of 
other guns or tools.  So, they can testify to something that is 
plenty precise as far as it goes but hazards inaccuracy by 
leaving out the larger picture.78  It would be the equivalent of 
stating that an alleged perpetrator’s DNA was found at the 
scene of a crime without explaining that the suspect actually 
lives in the house. 
Fingerprint analysis further illustrates the way in which 
labels conveying reliability tend to stick.  Another guild of 
forensic examiners claims the ability to match latent prints 
from a crime scene to identified samples, with a high degree of 
certainty.  For the most part, courts admit fingerprints because 
they have always admitted fingerprints; they consider them the 
archetype of reliability because they have been used as 
evidence for roughly 100 years.79  Prints do display some 
distinctive ridge patterns from the loops and arches of the 
human fingertip, but there is no science supporting 
 77 David H. Kaye, How Daubert and Its Progeny Have Failed Criminalistic 
Evidence and a Few Things the Judiciary Could Do About It, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1639, 1645 (2018). 
 78 See, e.g., Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm 
Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 895 (2005) (concluding 
that traditional forensic identification sciences rely on untested assumptions and 
semi-informed guesswork). 
 79 See Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the 
Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789, 790 (2011). 
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conclusions about how likely or unlikely particular sets of 
features are to repeat in different individuals.  Moreover, the 
most common fingerprinting method has no standard test 
protocols and relies on subjective assessments of similarities. 
When experts testify to matches, however, courts have been 
“unable to muster the most minimal grasp of why a 
standardless form of comparison might lack evidentiary 
reliability or trustworthiness.”80 
Courts continue to permit such testimony despite a 
shattering National Academy of Sciences report in 2009 that 
concluded that the forensics based on what’s called “pattern 
matching” or “feature comparison” fall well short of scientific 
standards.  The discredited techniques include handwriting 
analysis, bite-marks, ballistics, footwear and tire impressions, 
tool marks, voice prints, microscopic hair comparison, blood 
spatter, textile fibers, and burn patterns in arson cases.81  
None of it is supported by scientific validity, or at least there 
has not been sufficient scientific testing to validate its 
reliability.82  A subsequent 2016 report by the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) further 
enumerated the lack of validation studies and the urgent need 
for reform in forensic analysis and testimony.83 
That is not to say that pattern comparison is irrelevant 
across the board—it just is not as scientific as it purports to 
be.  As the PCAST report details, empirical studies do not 
establish that these methods are repeatable, reproducible, and 
accurate.84  They do not yield a binary “match” or “non-match” 
because choices factor heavily into the analysis.  Prosecutors 
may present them as unassailable, but they rely on subjective 
human judgment about which features to compare and how to 
determine if they are sufficiently similar.  In some cases, 
factfinders could even receive the data, hear a basic 
explanation, make comparisons, and draw conclusions about 
the probabilities themselves. 
80 Erin Murphy, Neuroscience and the Civil/Criminal Daubert Divide, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 624 (2016). 
81 See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD 189 (2009). 
82 Id. (concluding that “[l]ittle rigorous systematic research has been done to 
validate” these “basic premises and techniques” of forensic pattern matching). 
83 See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY 
OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 86–120 (2016) (noting observed false positive 
rates that render these methods scientifically unreliable). 
84 Id. 
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In its reasoning, the Daubert Court recognized that science 
is a process rather than a collection of facts, and that the 
explanations it offers about the world are subject to further 
testing and refinement.  The Daubert rule that followed from 
the opinion, however, does not do enough to exclude unreliable 
expert testimony, and it is now widely regarded as too vague to 
support accurate screening.85  In practice, trial judges rarely 
reject forensic testimony offered by prosecutors in criminal 
cases, and it takes decades for scientific advances to find 
acceptance and expression in court.  And, although appellate 
courts may closely screen scientific evidence admitted by trial 
judges in civil cases, they almost never overturn rulings on 
forensics in criminal cases. 
To accommodate the competing languages of science and 
law, the Daubert rule emphasizes flexibility about how to 
assess reliability.86  Over time, that flexibility has meant too 
much emphasis on the measures that are most familiar to 
courts, like precedents that have accepted particular 
techniques or the training, experience, and qualifications of 
experts.  “Each ill-informed decision becomes a precedent 
binding on future cases.”87  Most courts functionally apply the 
pre-Daubert standard from Frye, which rewards the sincerity 
of the proponent’s belief in the value of the evidence.  They even 
regard past testimonial descriptions of accuracy as an “implicit 
history of testing.”88  Here the preference for honesty manifests 
itself as an affinity for recognizing authority. 
Experts who are convincing, commanding, or just honestly 
committed to a methodology are thus permitted to testify even 
when their testimony does not meet the standards of rigor, 
reliability, and accuracy that Daubert purports to require.89  
And they are too often allowed to state that their methodologies 
definitively establish that a defendant was present at a crime 
scene, when they may be relying on assumptions and making 
85 See Kaye, supra note 77, at 1642. 
 86 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993); see also 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). 
87 Harry T. Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, Reflections on the Findings of the National Academy 
of Sciences Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science 
Community (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/EdwardsSpeechtoNCFS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5FUS-VHVV]. 
88 See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 89 See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 278 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., 
dissenting) (critiquing reliance on the “dogged certainty” of fingerprint examiners 
to admit their testimony). 
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estimations that can produce error rates comparable to the 
false identifications made by lay eyewitnesses. 
Moreover, using scientific vocabulary to state conclusions 
that may be imprecise or contain motivated reasoning might 
be truth-hindering in a broader sense.  A recent study 
estimated that intuitive error rate measurements for scientific 
experts range from 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 10,000,000.90  And 
experiments involving jury simulations reveal that an expert’s 
credentials and confidence matter more than the substance of 
scientific testimony to the jury’s assessment of credibility. 
Meanwhile, about 60% of the documented wrongful 
convictions have occurred in cases that involved this sort of 
identification or feature-comparison evidence.91  This is a 
serious misalignment between assumptions about forensic 
expertise and its tested reliability.  Recognizing that the sincere 
commitment of forensic experts does not necessarily yield 
accurate testimony could at least widen the avenues to 
challenge it, with ample alternative explanations, probing 
questioning, competing experts, and careful assessments of 
suspect methodologies by courts. 
V 
THE APPEAL OF LIE DETECTION 
To overcome some of the conceptions of honesty that cause 
error, we have to understand where they originated.  They 
intersect, as it happens, with a longstanding and still-evolving 
challenge to Daubert: lie detection itself.  The possibility of an 
accurate and scientific way to identify deception has been 
discussed since the early 1900s.  And it has contributed to the 
notion that lying or not lying is a binary distinction, and that 
the right procedure can expose whether the lever has moved. 
A 1907 New York Times article predicted that “[a] few years 
hence, no innocent person will be kept in jail, nor, on the other 
hand, will any guilty person cheat the demands of justice.”92  
That still has not happened, of course.  Lie detection has thus 
far been almost universally excluded from trials because of its 
high error rate and potential to mislead the jury (although a 
 90 See Jonathan J. Koehler, Intuitive Error Rate Estimates for the Forensic 
Sciences, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 153 (2017). 
 91 Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony 
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009). 
 92 Invents Machine for “Cure of Liars”: Professor Munsterberg Experiments to 
Reduce Knowledge of Truth to a Science, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1907), cited in 
GEOFFREY C. BUNN, THE TRUTH MACHINE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE LIE DETECTOR 
100 (2012). 
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suspect’s willingness to submit to polygraphs can be deemed 
relevant evidence of state of mind). 
Developing technologies like functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) might change the status of lie 
detection in court.  Conventional polygraph tests, which fail 
the Daubert test for reliability, measure external stress 
responses and rely on a few measures of arousal.  fMRI uses 
thousands of data points per subject and looks for cognitive 
processes inside the brain that indicate the effort and intent to 
deceive.93  As it proceeds through further testing and 
validation, fMRI poses closer and closer questions under 
Daubert and might ultimately meet the standard for admission 
and be a regular subject of expert testimony.  If detecting lies 
ever looks more like DNA testing than demeanor assessments, 
that will raise new questions about the place of lie detection in 
the larger search for truth. 
The allure of lie detection by any method begins with the 
adversarial system to which we are committed.  It stresses 
testimony by the parties rather than an inquisitorial process 
in which the courts take a more active role in investigation.  In 
theory, truth emerges in an adversarial system from the 
market forces of conflict and competition at trial and not just 
from some neutral inquiry into what happened.94  But in 
practice, adversarial process is “error-prone in a world of 
unequal resources.”95  Inquisitorial systems have deeper 
institutional competencies in determining historical facts and 
an explicit mandate to identify ground truths.96  In contrast, 
adversarial trials are uniquely and sometimes entirely reliant 
on the reports of witnesses rather than primary investigation 
by the trier of fact.  Accordingly, they feature this “structured 
process for the determination of the credibility of strangers, 
many of whom will, for one reason or another, try to deceive 
those who rely upon their word.”97  That process emphasizes 
honesty and depends on internal rather than external validity, 
which can confound truth-seeking. 
The substance of criminal law further reinforces these 
93 See Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-based Lie Detection: Scientific 
and Societal Challenges, 15 NATURE 123 (Jan. 20, 2014), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn3665 [https://perma.cc/SU94-U565]. 
94 See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 
1690-91 (2009). 
95 Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 
699, 713 (2014). 
96 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of 
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1588 (2005). 
97 Uviller, supra note 37, at 776. 
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structural choices by imposing broad liability for lies about 
offenses.  There are approximately 4,000 federal crimes, and 
about 300 of them have something to do with deception, 
including perjury, the various obstruction offenses, and 
making false statements in investigations.98  The criminal 
justice system not only sorts and labels liars but also sends 
messages about the prevalence of lying itself.  From celebrity 
athletes to high-flying financiers, notorious defendants like 
Barry Bonds and Bernie Madoff have faced liability for lying.99  
And prosecutors have charged an expanding range of 
defendants with nothing but dishonesty in the context of an 
investigation.  It was once thought unsporting to pursue a 
charge for lying about wrongdoing if the proof was not available 
on the underlying offense.  But now lying charges are a 
common device to elicit cooperation, enforce governmental 
authority, or just expediently close a case.  And the variations 
on liability for dishonesty in the criminal code mean that many 
suspects expose themselves to easy charges as soon as they 
engage with investigators.100 
The fundamental impenetrability of intent in a complex 
case makes these charges especially attractive.  When liability 
turns on the wrongfulness with which a defendant acted, 
factfinders must “infer the mental state of a defendant they do 
not know as he acted in a way they did not see.”101  Prosecutors 
find it less demanding to assert that a defendant simply said 
something false, as that requires less “sift[ing] through the 
surface level of conduct for signals about internal mental 
processes.”102  When investigators regard a suspect’s lie as 
something observable, and courtroom rules supposedly 
“detect” dishonesty, factfinding appears to stand on much 
firmer ground. 
That desire for certainty also helps explain the intense 
interest in detecting dishonesty well beyond the courtroom. 
Fascination with lying has its roots in the frustrations of the 
intersubjectivity divide.  Between people and even those they 
98 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018). 
99 See JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS: HOW FALSE STATEMENTS ARE 
UNDERMINING AMERICA: FROM MARTHA STEWART TO BERNIE MADOFF 265, 363 
(2011). 
100 See Eric Posner, The Lying Game, NEW REPUBLIC (May 29, 2011), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/tangled-webs-james-stewart 
[https://perma.cc/JHS3-9ZMB]. 
101 Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1307 
(2011). 
102 Samuel W. Buell & Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness 
of Wrongdoing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 153 (2012). 
2018] HONESTY WITHOUT TRUTH   44 
know the best and love the most, there will always be a 
barrier.103  No path leads directly into someone else’s thoughts, 
and thus assurances of accurate expressions of the content of 
another’s mind fill a basic need.  Trusting others is essential 
to survival.104  Navigating through the world requires 
communication, implicit trust in the information that is 
transmitted, and sustainable social relationships.  A classic 
study of the 1960s surveyed participants on 555 different 
personality traits, and the one that rated 555th on the list was 
“liar.”105  Yet perceived honesty again suffices—in our 
“hypersocial” network of relationships, what feels forthcoming 
often rates as more satisfying than what rationality suggests is 
accurate. 
Despite the evolutionary imperative to trust, lying seems 
to be everywhere.106  It is ordinary human behavior and even a 
necessary stage of development.  “By inventing deceptions and 
withholding information, children establish boundaries 
between self and others, test the limits of adult power and 
control, and move toward independent thought and action.”107  
Adults then lie with ease and frequency, to both strangers and 
intimates.  The consequences of lies range from devastating to 
benign, but there is no question that people lie a lot, for many 
reasons: job applicants seeking advantage, classmates and 
colleagues making excuses, potential romantic partners 
hoping to impress.108 
For all the interest in deception—across popular culture, 
 103 See Joel Krueger, Seeing Mind in Action, 11 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE
SCI. 149, 149–51 (2012) (discussing the empirical problem of other minds and 
“the use of our own mental states to imaginatively simulate what another person 
is likely thinking and feeling”); see also Susan C. Johnson, The Recognition of 
Mentalistic Agents in Infancy, 4 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 22, 22 (2000) (“Mental 
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https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2017/06/lying-hoax-false-
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academic disciplines, and political discourse—we still know 
very little about it.  Recent developments in the social sciences 
reveal how poorly deception is understood.109  It is tricky to 
recreate clinically, and many of the published studies on its 
nature and frequency fail to replicate.110  It turns out that it is 
difficult to identify ground truths about lying itself, and it is 
not nearly as straightforward of a concept as the rules around 
it would suggest. 
CONCLUSION 
Because lying is both a pervasive act and a mysterious 
concept, entirely predictable but impossible to detect with 
precision, perhaps we should not regard it as so independently 
consequential.  Part of the work of the criminal justice system 
is to make some determinations about who speaks honestly.  
In many cases, that sorting will also support accurate 
outcomes, but at times the focus on honesty enforcement will 
obscure larger and more significant truths.  Rooting out lies 
and rewarding honesty are fine as far as they go, but they are 
not enough to maximize accuracy.  It may be easier to tell 
whether someone has lied than whether all of the relevant 
information has been gathered, but getting things right 
remains the underlying value of the process.  The most 
important purpose of investigations and trials transcends lie 
detection.  Finding facts, adjudicating guilt, and even 
protecting the integrity of other public institutions require a 
new balance that privileges engagement. 
Both the procedures discussed here and the substantive 
criminal law offer incremental opportunities to expand truth-
seeking.  I take the system we have as a given, recognizing both 
the power that law enforcement agents wield in investigations 
and the persistence of the adversarial process.  But the 
limitations of common interrogation techniques, the costs of 
the impeachment and confrontation rules, and the failures of 
Daubert screening are increasingly apparent.  Some 
interpretations of the lying offenses have also moved toward 
imposing liability for lying only when the statements in 
question introduce inaccuracy.  Lying prosecutions can be 
both over- and under-inclusive.  Some targets of obstruction 
 109 See, e.g., ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 1–2 (2d ed. 2008). 
 110 See Daniel Engber, LOL Something Matters, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://slate.com/health-and-science/2018/01/weve-been-told-were-living-in-
a-post-truth-age-dont-believe-it.html [https://perma.cc/9R5E-MQVN]. 
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cases do not merit prosecutorial resources,111 and other cases 
narrow too quickly to proxy indictments when the underlying 
criminality is of significant public concern and should give rise 
to the substantive charges.  A few recent decisions have shifted 
in the direction of recognizing that not all lies are equally 
deserving of criminal sanction.  Cases concerning lies to get 
elected,112 to claim unearned honors,113 and to obtain 
citizenship114 suggest that there is more to determining when 
dishonesty supports liability than the straightforward question 
whether someone has uttered a falsehood.  A binary approach 
to “lying” has often masked vital evidence and silenced 
witnesses, and a more pluralistic conception of “truth” as the 
product of many voices and perspectives could help dislodge 
some longstanding sources of error. 
Clarity about the distinction between telling lies and the 
status of empiricism is also vital because courts are now called 
upon to perform a broader repair function.  The fundamental 
advantage of legal institutions is the background requirement 
of engagement.  In court, opposing parties are required to “join 
issue,” and factfinders assess and reconcile their conflicting 
accounts and interpretations of events.  Outside of the 
courtroom, the divisions in public life increasingly involve 
doubts about verifiable facts, and models for identifying and 
agreeing to them are more essential than ever.  Official 
statements now seem so unreliable that there is little effort to 
correct falsehoods or assess their impact, and journalists have 
resorted to just counting how many thousands of times some 
governmental figures lie.115  The lies may mean less and less, 
but the crisis over shared facts matters. 
The Oxford Dictionary’s 2016 word of the year was “post-
truth,” which was defined as the “circumstances in which 
 111 See John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, For Feds, ‘Lying’ Is a Handy 
Charge, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2012, 10:36 PM), 
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objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion 
than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”116  Even facts 
that consist of numbers—crime rates, climate data, economic 
indicators, trade deficits—do not stay stable across different 
communities of interest.117  The problem of entitlement to 
invented facts itself is not new.  Ten years before “post-truth” 
was declared a pivotal concept, Merriam-Webster’s word of the 
year was “truthiness,” coined by comedian Stephen Colbert to 
describe “the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes 
to be true, rather than concepts of facts known to be true.”118  
And even before that phrase entered the lexicon, political 
operatives spoke dismissively of the policy prescriptions 
favored by the “reality-based community.”119 
Although the contested nature of ground truths did not 
suddenly emerge, it does seem newly urgent.  The volume and 
influence of opinion over fact has increased.  Empiricism and 
expertise no longer generate consensus,120 and growing 
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Dictionaries (Nov. 16, 2016), WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-
named-2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries/ 
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ambivalence about the nature of evidence itself is corroding 
democratic norms.121  Carefully establishing facts and reliably 
screening expertise in court could provide some counterweight 
to the denigration of science and data in post-truth 
discourse.122  Outside of the structured system of legal 
institutions, “the most grossly obvious facts can be ignored 
when they are unwelcome.”123  Of course, the adversarial 
process causes some distortions, as do the cognitive biases of 
prosecutors, judges, and jurors, but the core commitment of 
investigation and adjudication is to identify objective truths.124  
And finding right answers is a “fundamental goal of our legal 
system.”125 
Courtrooms can also play a pivotal role in preserving 
democratic aspirations because—in contrast to fractured 
media environments and polarized political discourse126¾the 
ideas in question actually come into direct contact.  Going to 
court means leaving the echo chamber.  Adversaries have to 
sit in the same room.  One has no choice but to recognize the 
standing of others and to respond to claims.  Witnesses take 
oaths and must answer questions.  Deliberately misleading the 
court has potential criminal consequences.  Evidentiary rules 
society will change: it will be those with the power to enforce their ideas or those 
with the most media appeal who will make our truths.”). 
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endeavor to screen out illegitimate sources of expertise, and 
judges reject false claims of authority.127  Neutral factfinders 
evaluate the quality of arguments and the consistency of 
assertions.  Advocates present data, to which decision makers 
apply analytical thinking.  And the process generates 
something agreed upon, or at least accepted, as a just 
conclusion. 
Truth “is not an absolute or a relative, but a skill—a 
muscle, like memory—that collectively we have neglected so 
much that we have grown measurably weaker at using it.”128 
Courts can continue to exercise that muscle and build it up 
again.  Facts can change minds in court, and courts could 
change minds about facts themselves.  That will require 
listening—to what suspects are really saying, to what all sorts 
of witnesses want to reveal, and to data and science. 
By addressing tensions between rules about honesty and 
broader goals involving accuracy in the criminal justice 
system, courts can better demonstrate epistemic competence 
in the face of complexity and uncertainty.  They can model 
engagement with competing stories and many sources of 
information.  They can insist on shared realities and accepted 
outcomes however strong adversary positions may be.  By 
finding common baselines despite intense conflict—producing 
legitimate legal truth—courts could help restore reasoned 
public discourse about facts. 
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